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Forewords 
 
 
Natural hazards (earthquake, landslides, floods, forest fires, coastal erosion, heat waves…) 
are challenging threats. The degree of impact of such hazards primarily depends on the 
vulnerability level of the affected territory or society. Therefore, vulnerability is a fundamental 
element in the process of risk governance. But so far there has been no consistent method to 
deal with vulnerability. So there is the need for a vulnerability assessment concept with a 
generic and holistic approach, which can be offered to practitioners in different regions and on 
all administrative levels.  
Also necessary, is a common understanding of the terminology, used in the field of risk 
governance. The provided glossary added to the manual will give a helpful support to all 
participants in their work on vulnerability assessment.  
The manual provides an excellent assistance to stakeholders on every administrative level. As 
a representative of a German national authority I am sure that the concept is also useful for 
education and training, which can be provided to practitioners from the Laender and 
municipalities.  
I am grateful that I could take part in the MOVE-Project and could make a contribution to the 
development of this manual. 
 
 
Jürgen Strauß  
President‟s Office,  
Bonn (Germany) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. AIM OF THE MANUAL 
 
Natural hazards heavily impact land and 
society.In recent decades, public policy makers 
and land users have become increasingly 
conscious of the need to manage risks in order to 
mitigate or adapt to their causes or 
consequences. Major disasters such as the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010 or the Sendai (Japan) 
earthquake in 2011 are examples of cumulative 
hazards, which reinforce this consciousness and 
the need to consider the potentially impacted 
system as a whole (Figure 1). 
Vulnerability of a territory to a hazard results 
from the interactions between environmental 
conditions and society: it is a combined effect of 
hazard exposure, sensivity of the different 
components of the territory and society, 
andcapacity or lack of resilience. 
Stakeholders and policy makers have a good 
base of knowledge of their territory and of its 
main challenges. Managing risk is one of those 
challenges, with the objective of mitigating and/or 
adapting to the consequences on society and 
heritage. Vulnerability assessments are the 
preliminary step implementation of such risk 
management strategies  
The MOVE FP7 project has gathered knowledge 
about risks from 13 European teams to propose a 
holistic framework and to provide the necessary 
tools for vulnerability assessments of territories 
exposed to natural hazards. 
The objective of this manual is to provide a 
procedural guide for stakeholders and policy 
makers to assess vulnerability to natural 
hazards, using indicators. 
It is designed to put in practice the conceptual 
framework proposed by MOVE in tangible cases. 
Main procedural steps are described. Main tools 
to be used are shortly described in reference to 
other MOVE deliverable in the joint DVD or via 
web-links in order to give illustration of the 
proposed procedure. 
 
   
 © AFPS, D. Bertil, BRGM © H. Aochi, BRGM 
Figure 1: Illustration from recent major events underlining the need for generic  
and holistic approach of risk. 
(left) Haïti, Collapse of the presidential palace, 2010- © AFPS, D. Bertil, BRGM; (right) Onagawa Japan, 2011:  
Paraseismic building pushed over by the tsunami return wave- © H. Aochi, BRGM. 
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1.2. SCOPE 
 
This manual is designed to help stakeholders 
when they have to assess the vulnerability of a 
territory and a society, to one or more natural 
hazard.  
The proposed procedure is generic, i.e. 
independent of the considered hazard, territory, 
or scale. Therefore, it can be adapted to fit the 
specific needs of each assessment. 
Vulnerability assessments, using this manual, 
are to be led and organized by stakeholders 
and/or policy/decision makers (practitioners, 
local or regional authorities, NGOs…). In order to 
guarantee sound risk governance, it is their 
responsibility to adapt and to dimension the work 
to be done, depending on the concerned hazard, 
risks, and involved assets, as well as on existing 
knowledge. 
Vulnerability assessment is a preliminary step 
towards risk governance and risk management 
strategies. It is the main focus of this manual and 
of the MOVE project. Going further may induce a 
process of building scenarios of risk 
management (“what if…?”) and eventually iterate 
the vulnerability assessment considering how 
different management strategies could modify 
the vulnerability. The comparison of the 
vulnerability assessment resulting from different 
scenarios will help to choose the best strategy 
for risk management. 
1.3. CONTENT 
 
1.3.1. A generic framework 
The MOVE generic concept of vulnerability 
includes different components and is set within a 
holistic framework of risk assessment, 
governance and management.Built as a result of 
a state-of-the art review (Ref) and of common 
agreement of the MOVE team on terminology 
and the relationship between components of 
vulnerability, this framework creates a holistic 
and integrated approach to vulnerability 
assessment. 
1.3.2. Procedural steps 
The procedural steps to make a vulnerability 
assessment include: 
 Organizing the work between the different 
partners implied in risk management (working 
group, milestones and inter-milestone 
tasks...), 
 Adapting the generic conceptual chart to the 
specific case, 
 Defining the objective of the assessment, 
(space and time, territory and society 
components), 
 Developing indicator sets per causal factors 
for each component of vulnerability (exposure, 
susceptibility/fragility, lack of resilience), 
assuming that the hazard component is 
already known; assessing uncertainty of 
indicators, 
 Aggregating these indicators and factors to 
obtain a holistic (comprehensive) assessment 
of vulnerability, 
 Considering, if necessary, furthers steps and 
tools to arrive at risk management strategies 
(Figure 2). 
1.3.3. A Tool box 
Completing a vulnerability assessment using 
MOVE methods implies as a core tool, 
developping indicators and combining indicators. 
This tool is described together with other tools 
that will be usedduring the process, to keep track 
of uncertainty throughout the analysis, and rely 
as much as possible on spatialization and 
scaling, Complementary tools will help to 
stepping forwards on risk management. 
1.3.4. Other MOVE deliverables 
To support stakeholders in the application of the 
MOVE vulnerability assessment generic 
approach, a joint DVD enclosed gives the MOVE 
glossary in which the specific terminology used 
in this project and proposed procedure is 
explained. It is the result of a consensual and 
trans-disciplinary vocabulary convention 
between partners from different training 
backgrounds, and may have different meanings 
Assessing vulnerability to natural hazards in Europe: from principles to practice  
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in other approaches. Using the MOVE approach 
implies referring to the MOVE glossary. 
Case studies about different natural hazard 
vulnerability assessments have been completed 
within the MOVE project. Posters showing the 
application of part or whole procedure are 
enclosed in the DVD. 
Numerous indicators and factors reflecting the 
vulnerability components have been developed 
and gathered in a database that can be used as 
a checklist and a guide to identify possible 
indicators(http://www.move-fp7.eu). 
 
 
Figure 2: Management of earthquake and tsunami risk (Thailand)- ©E. Pitot, BRGM. 
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2. Generic conceptual framework for a vulnerability 
assessment 
2.1. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS. WHAT IS KNOWN? WHAT IS MISSING? WHAT ARE 
THE NEEDS? 
 
An increase in consciousness following disasters 
that occurred in the last decade (hurricane 
Katrina, Haiti earthquake, Indian Ocean tsunami, 
recent events in Japan…) has helped to develop 
knowledge and tools to mitigate or adapt to the 
consequences of natural hazard events. As 
explained in the glossary (refer to theDVD), risk 
is commonly described as a function of hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and adaptation capacity. 
Natural hazards are physical phenomena 
(earthquakes, floods, landslides…) caused by 
natural processes (plate tectonics, heavy 
rains…).The spatial extent of the hazard 
delimitates the exposure of a geographical zone 
(or a system). Depending on the regions social, 
economic and environmental dimensions and its 
capacity to react, this area will be more or less 
vulnerable to the hazard.  
Vulnerability is usually related to the exposure, 
susceptibility, and fragility of society and its 
components, as well as its capacity to react to a 
hazardous event. Risk is thus the result of a 
potential hazard and vulnerability conditions of 
an exposed system. Intense hazard and/or high 
vulnerability lead to disaster when hazards 
occur. 
Reducing risk implies considering the social as 
well as physical aspects of risk.  
Risk management must be part of the decision 
making process when dealing with post-disaster 
recovery. It is also essential in public policy 
formulation and development planning to 
strengthen risk management capacity of all types 
and therefore reduce vulnerability.  
Existing risks must be identified and recognized 
as well as the possibility of emerging 
vulnerability. In Europe, evaluation and follow-up 
of vulnerability and risk isunavoidable for diverse 
social actors and those responsible for its 
management. Consequently, evaluation and 
follow-up must be undertaken using appropriate 
and ideal methods that facilitate an 
understanding of the problem and orient decision 
making. 
The capability of decision-makers to make 
efficient choices regarding risk management and 
vulnerability mitigation is hampered by the fact 
that risk management rules, often empirically 
built,do not approach the problem holistically. 
Therefore, there is a lack of data and a poor 
quantitative analysis ofsome risk components. In 
Europe, there is no effective way to monitor 
vulnerability and risk management to assess 
vulnerability trends and compare them between 
regions or countries.  
Assessing vulnerability of a territory or a system 
is essential, despite the uncertainty linked to lack 
of knowledge or potentiality of hazard 
occurrence, assessing vulnerability. However 
this uncertainty is to be explained and adjusted 
whenever knowledge progresses allow it. 
The MOVE procedure aims to fill the gaps in 
currently used methodologies by:  
 addressing vulnerability assessment with a 
holistic approach to risk governances; 
 building indicators that: 
- allow assessment of interactions between 
components,  
- are understandable by decision makers and 
stakeholders, 
- are, as much as possible, quantified and 
spatialized, and  
- have been validated in case studies and are 
reproducible; 
 keeping track of the uncertainties inherent in 
risk assessments. 
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2.2. NEED FOR A HOLISTIC APPROACH 
 
Vulnerability and risk assessments have to take 
into account both the physical aspects of risk as 
well as the social, cultural, institutional and 
environmental aspects. It is also critical to 
determine the capacity or not to anticipate, cope 
with and recover from hazards, as a lack of 
resilience will increase vulnerability. This 
suggests that an assessment of risk and risk 
management involves the integration of diverse 
disciplinary perspectives, which may 
causeproblems of comparability.  
Physical reality has a concrete aspect that allows 
the use of factual measures and mathematical 
models, giving quantitative data with relative 
uncertainties. Social and economic reality relies 
more on qualitative analysis. Quantitative data in 
these fields refer to an estimated or modelled 
value (merchant, contingent, hedonic…).  
Literature shows a wide range of approaches for 
integrating data and modelling risk: 
 Inductive approaches (Cardona O.D. et al., 
2003)  model risk through weighting and 
combining different hazard, vulnerability and 
risk reduction variables. An obstacle to 
inductive modelling is the lack of accepted 
procedures for assigning values and weights 
to the different vulnerability and hazard factors 
that contribute to risk. 
 Deductive approaches are based on the 
modelling of historical patterns of materialized 
risk (i.e. disasters, or damage and loss that 
have already occurred). Deductive modelling 
will not accurately reflect risk in contexts 
where disasters occur infrequently or where 
historical data is not available. In spite of this 
weakness, deductive modelling offers a short 
cut to risk indexing in many contexts and can 
be used to validate the results from inductive 
models. 
 Other approaches combine the results of 
inductive and deductive modelling.  
Most risk models aim to achieve risk reduction. 
However, there is no standard procedure for 
measuring or weighting the effectiveness of risk 
reduction, given the large number of 
stakeholders and the wide variety of activities 
involved. 
The validity of a risk assessment will depend on 
the existence of reliable and high quality data 
that satisfy the demands of the conceptual risk 
model. Data availability is today a major 
constraint. The lack of data is explained by the 
following reasons: 
 Most existing risk information is often limited to 
hazard patterns.  
 There is little comparable and accurate 
quantitative data on social and economic 
vulnerability, or on risk reduction factors.  
 Data is produced in widely different formats 
and scales, which renders its compilation and 
aggregation problematic.  
 Due to institutional and human resource 
constraints, data is rarely collected 
systematically over long time periods.  
 Most data describing damages, such as those 
from insurance companies, are limited to 
large-scale disasters, and data related to 
small-scale events are often incomplete. 
To assess vulnerability, risk, and risk 
management, it is essential to have a holistic or 
global view (addressing the different aspects as 
a whole). Such an integrated and 
multidisciplinary approach will allows 
consideration of the physical context, the 
complexity and dynamics of social and 
environmental systems, and the relationship 
between them. A holistic approach will 
encourage more effective risk governance and 
management through the development of 
preventative strategies to face risks and 
disasters. 
The result of a holistic approach will help to 
formulate the problem and to give an answer, 
with associated uncertainties and 
approximations, but taking into account the 
whole aspect of risk (Cardona O.D., 2001). 
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2.3. THE MOVE GENERIC CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A conceptual framework that addresses 
vulnerability and risk to natural hazards from a 
holistic and multidimensional point of view has 
been developed by the MOVE project (Figure 3). 
It is generic in order to facilitate the initial 
identification of elements of coupled social-
ecological systems (when making a vulnerability 
assessment) and to guide logical and 
comparative development of indicators. 
The diagram of the generic conceptual 
framework illustrates two concepts: 
 Risk is the result of the exposure of society to 
hazards, in time and space, and of the 
vulnerability of the society. The hazards are 
natural or socio-natural events, which are a 
combination of society and environment. 
 Risk management and adaptation aim to 
modify the initial vulnerability conditions or 
hazards. 
 
Figure 3: MOVE conceptual framework of a holistic approach to disaster risk assessment  
and management. 
 
Going deeper in these concepts, allows to list 
other components of particular importance (see 
DVD glossary). 
The possibility of events, extreme or not, 
represents the hazard (Figure 4). 
Hazard propagation will expose (Figure 5) a 
geographic zone and its society (people, 
dwellings, infrastructure...). 
Vulnerability is a combined result of exposure, 
susceptibility (fragility) and resilience (capacity 
to anticipate, cope and recover). Identification 
and awareness of hazards, vulnerability and 
risk are essential steps to establish effective 
management of risks caused by geological, 
hydro-meteorological and even anthropogenic 
or technological hazards.  
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© UNU-EHS, 2010 
Figure 4: Illustration of flooding hazard: inundated sidewalk in Bonn (Germany). 
 
 
 
 
 
©Buchholz 
 
© Bundesarchiv 
Figure 5: Exposure: Geographical zone (territory) and system in which people,  
areas and buildings could be exposed to a hazard (Cologne, Germany, exposure map  
and illustration of the floods in 1993 and 1995). 
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©dpa  
 
©Wasserwirtschaftsamt Weilheim 
Physical (e.g. damaged houses because of poor building materials) Ecological (e.g. affected forest areas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©:Nahstoll, Sail and Fun, 2010 
Social (e.g. affected people, especially  
the elderly who are more susceptible) 
 
© Sean Gallup/Getty Images 
Economic (e.g. damages to cars caused by flooding) 
 
© Stefan Grothues, Thorsten Ohm, Manfred Elfering 
 
© ddp 
Institutional (e.g. institutional facilities like emergency response services 
are affected) 
Cultural (e.g. cultural heritage suffered   
due to flooding) 
Figure 6: Susceptibility/fragility: predisposition of elements at risk to suffer harm  
(Cologne, Germany 1993 and 1995 floods). 
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Susceptibility and fragility (Figure 6) are 
vulnerability conditions that reflect the 
predisposition (weaknesses and lack of 
strength) than can be expressed in physical, 
ecological, social, economic, cultural and 
institutional terms. These aspects are related to 
the vulnerability dimensions or taxonomy at 
each considered scale. 
 
The lack of resilience (Figure 7) is another 
important vulnerability factor that reflects the 
capacity level of a society to anticipate (to 
intervene proactively the risk conditions), to 
adapt (to be prepared to face future hazardous 
events), as well to cope and recover effectively 
when such events occur. A lack of these 
capacities increases the vulnerability of the 
society. 
 
Hazard and vulnerability trigger the risk, which 
is the potential impact of the hazard occurrence 
on economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of society. The degree of risk will 
depend both on the susceptibility (or fragility) 
and the lack of resilience of society (and of the 
environment, in some cases), as well as how 
they are related to exposure (from local to 
national and international scales). 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity to anticipate : fire station trucks ready  
for interventions (Dominican Republic) 
© Diana Maria Contrejas Mojica 
 
Capacity to recover: e.g. available resources  
for relief and recovery assistance 
© Bild:SN/Riedlsperger/Bundesheer, Austria 
 
Capacity to cope: e.g. the available resources  
to reduce the impacts of floods 
© Thomas Richter/ Wikipedia 
Figure 7: Lack of Resilience encompasses the capacity of the short term societal response  
to reduce the negative impacts caused by a given hazardous event. 
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Risk governance promotes suitable conditions 
for institutional and community organization and 
management, regarding the comprehension and 
reduction of risk. It is possible to reduce risk and 
efficiently deal with disasters through prevention, 
mitigation, risk transfer, and crisis management 
preparedness. When dealing with climate-related 
events, risk management implies adaptation to 
climate variability and climate change. 
Risk management (Figure 8) actions target 
hazard reduction, whenever this is possible and 
feasible, and vulnerability reduction. This is 
achieved in hazard prone areas by reducing 
exposure, susceptibility and fragility of the 
different dimensions of societyand by promoting 
the improvement of resilience, in all its 
dimensions. 
Adaptation and adaptive capacities include 
techniques and strategies that enable society to 
absorb and deflect the impact of hazards, as well 
asfocusing on interactions and changes that take 
place in the long term. 
 
 
 
 
Hazard intervention: e.g. through the design  
and construction of retention areas 
©UNU-EHS 
 
Susceptibility reduction and resilience improvement:  
e.g. through capacity building training and planning measures 
© GDRC 2008-2010 
 
Exposure reduction: e.g. through the construction  
of dykes in order to protect residential areas 
© Schaperdot Baumaschinen 
Figure 8: Example of risk management via actions to reduce the risk impact. 
 
For further details 
 
Alexander D., et al, (in writing), Assessment of vulnerability 
to Natural Hazards: A european perspective. Deliverable 5 
of the MOVE project 
 
Cardona, O.D.; Hurtado, J.E.; Duque, G.; Moreno, Á.M.; 
Chardon, A.C.; Velásquez, L.S.; Prieto, S.D. (2003): 
Indicators for Risk Measurement: 
Methodological fundamentals, IDB/IDEA Programme of 
Indicators for Disaster Risk Management. - Manizales: 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Cardona, O.D. (2001): “Estimación Holística del Riesgo 
Sísmico utilizando Sistemas Dinámicos Complejos”. 
Doctoral dissertation, Technical University of Catalonia, 
Department of Terrain Engineering, Barcelona, 
Spain. 
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3. The procedural steps for a MOVE vulnerability 
assessment 
3.1. PROCEDURAL STEPS TOWARDS A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The procedural steps are designed to assist the 
implementation by stakeholders of the above 
described conceptual framework to specific 
cases of risk management. The stakeholders will 
be in charge of implementing a vulnerability 
assessment in terms of risk governance and 
integrate it into a general objective of risk 
management. 
The procedural steps have thus to answer to the 
following questions: 
 What are the objectives and expectations of 
the stakeholders and policy makers when 
making a vulnerability assessment? How can 
indicators be used in a vulnerability 
assessment? 
 How can the assessment be guided by a 
holistic (comprehensive) approach to risk, risk 
governance, and management strategy? This 
must answer the following question: “a 
vulnerability assessment, what for?” How are 
the spatial and temporal scales taken into 
account?  
 How are the uncertainties evaluated?  
All these aspects are to be considered 
throughout the procedure.  
3.2. DESCRIPTION OF EACH STEP, AND ASSOCIATED TOOLS 
 
The flow chart (Figure 10) lists the chronology of 
the different steps. Steps are then described and 
related to the available tools that can be used for 
their implementation.  
Step1 is the starting point, in which the context 
and objective of the assessment are defined 
(“What for?”). 
Steps 2 and 3 are the core of the MOVE 
methodology, which aim complete to the 
vulnerability assessment by using indicators.  
Steps 4 to 8 propose different paths to integrate 
this vulnerability assessment in a risk 
management strategy with the goal of adapting 
to the risk or reducing it.  
 
 
Figure 9: Emergency operation, Coppito, L’Aquila, Italy (2009). © D. Alexander (Georisk Forum, Davos). 
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Figure 10: Procedural steps to apply the MOVE concetual framework of vulnerability assessment 
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3.2.1. Setting up the risk governance 
Step 1: Define the assessment objectives 
and frame 
The preliminary step for the coordinator of the 
assessment is to set up a working group that will 
define the objective and scale of the 
assessment. In other words, the coordinator will 
have to identify and gather participants for the 
working group. Participants should include: 
 stakeholders at different levels of implication, 
 scientists to validate the risk approach, if 
necessary, and 
 subcontractors in charge of the assessment 
procedure. 
This working group will be in charge of 
determining the work to be done, by applying the 
conceptual generic framework to the case by: 
 defining: 
- the purpose of the vulnerability assessment 
(national policy making, local risk 
management, prospective evolution, climate 
and society changes…), 
- how to integrate it in a risk management 
strategy, 
- the spatial and temporal scales of the 
assessment,  
- the hazard(s) to be considered, and the 
exposure (in time and space), 
- the vulnerability dimensions of interest in 
the assessment; 
 analysing and choosing the tools for defining 
and aggregating indicators. 
 
The above steps can be carried out during a 
workshop launching the project that could also 
include a field visit in order to understand the 
involved risks in their physical and societal 
context. The workshop can be the starting point 
for data collection and mining that will lead to the 
elaboration of vulnerability indicators.  
The working group will then have to follow and 
validate the progress of the assessment. 
3.2.2. Assessing the vulnerability 
a) Step 2: Develop dimension indicators 
The indicators are qualitative or quantitative 
elements that reflect the exposure, fragility and 
resilience components of the system.They will 
have been selected by the working group as of 
interest or significance within the generic 
framework, and within the spatial and temporal 
zone that is exposed to hazards. The indicator 
database (http://www.move-fp7.eu), developed 
and applied on with case studies (refer to the 
DVD) in the MOVE project, can be an initial 
“check list” (example of indicators for coastal 
erosion in Figure 11) for the working group. 
As specified in the toolbox (chapter 4.1) 
indicators have to be valid and relevant (respond 
to the objectives of the assessment), reliable 
(reproducible), specific to the surveyed 
phenomenon, sensitive to changes in the 
phenomenon, comparable, cost effective, and 
non-redundant. The indicators should also be 
transparent in their elaboration, allowing a quality 
control and simple visualisation when possible. 
The indicator can be a metric, a qualitative value, 
or the advice of an expert. It must have a spatial 
and temporal reference that can be delivered as 
a table or a map. 
b) Step 3: Combining indicators towards a 
vulnerability indicator 
In the previous step, numerous indicators 
specific to the different components of assessed 
dimensions will have been developed. It may be, 
then, necessary to identify core indicators and 
combined indicators to obtain a more integrated 
view of the vulnerability dimensions. 
Analysing the relationship between indicators by 
following “failures” propagation (such as the 
Leontieff Model described further) can help 
choosing core indicators and aggregation 
methods, if necessary.  
From the first level of indicators obtained in step 
2, core indicators will be developed to assess the 
causal factors of vulnerability (exposure, fragility, 
resilience). This second level of indicators can be 
the result of:  
 the selection of the most relevant and feasible 
indicators within the list, or  
 the aggregation of the initial indicators using 
correlation analysis, combining and weighting 
approaches, statistical treatment, grouping, 
etc. 
 
 
Assessing vulnerability to natural hazards in Europe: from principles to practice  
Manual on methods and concepts 
 20  
 
Susceptibility/Fragility 
Physical Ecological Social Economical 
Cultural / 
Patrimonial 
Institutional 
Efficiency of 
protection 
works 
Scarcity of 
ecosystem 
People per 
household 
GPD 
Disruption of 
cultural practise 
(tourism, religious 
practices) 
landscaping planning 
law and procedures 
Mobility of 
assets 
(strategic 
retreat) 
Mobility of 
ecosystem 
Unemployment 
rate 
Public funds availability 
(support beach 
protection works; cost of 
reposition of the 
infrastructures) 
 
relation between the 
local / state authorities 
Beach 
reduction 
(destruction) 
Salinization 
of 
groundwater 
Ratio of 
Secondary 
houses 
Disruption of productive 
activities  
Information availability 
and citizens 
participation 
mechanisms in public 
decisions 
 
Soil 
salinization  
Touristic turn-over 
  
   
Professional 
dependence to the 
territory (example: fishing 
activities, tourism) 
  
   
Family income 
  
Figure 11: Examples of susceptibility/fragility indicators proposed  
in the NW Portugal coastal erosion case study. 
 
The result will be one or several core indicator(s) 
(factors) or sets of indicators, allowing the 
assessment of each dimension of vulnerability 
(exposure, fragility, resilience). Hereafter (Figure 
12) is given an example of radar aggregation of 
land use indicators). 
From this secondary level, aggregation or 
selection can be used again to obtain one or 
several indicator(s) that will assess the 
vulnerability of the system or territory. 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of a radar aggregation of indicators, applied to the potential impact  
of future coastal erosion on different land use components, for geographic entities of the territory  
(here, parishes within the studied area). 
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3.2.3. Integrating vulnerability assessment in a risk management framework 
 
These steps allow the extension and application 
of the vulnerability assessment in order develop 
risk governance strategies. Depending of the 
objectives set up by the working group in step 1, 
the steps 4, 5 and 6 may or may not be 
considered. At the end of step 4, it can be 
considered either that the risk knowledge is 
sufficient to apply a risk management strategy 
(step 8), or to go further in building different 
management scenarios, to be able to make 
alternative choices (steps 5, 6, 7) before setting 
up a management strategy. 
a) Step 4: Risk assessment 
The vulnerability assessment will deliver one (or 
several) aggregated indicator(s) or a set of 
indicators reflecting the different causal factors of 
vulnerability to a hazard. The next step is to go 
from a vulnerability assessment to a risk 
assessment.  
In the previous steps, indicators reflecting the 
different dimensions (factors) of vulnerability will 
have been built. The vulnerability indicator(s) 
obtained in step 3 is (are) function of exposure, 
fragility and lack of resilience.  
Thus, risk will be considered as a function of 
hazard and the defined vulnerability indicators. 
The tools to be used are the same as those 
proposed for the combination of indicators. 
b) Step 5 (optional): Build scenarios of risk 
management strategies) (governance)  
Knowing the risk allows one to respond to it. The 
stakeholders from different institutional levels will 
set up a risk management strategy in response 
to this knowledge by applying risk governance 
principles. There are numerous choices of 
strategies to mitigate the risk or to adapt to it. 
These options can impact the different 
components of risk by reducing hazard, 
exposure or fragility of exposed assets, or by 
improving the resilience capacity. 
Before setting up such a program, the scenario 
tool can support decision making by considering 
a range of alternative strategies and evaluating 
which is the best. 
Scenarios are commonly built by referring to a 
significant historical hazardous event that could 
statistically happen again in the future and by 
modelling that event. They can also be built by 
using boundary conditions and/or more likely 
conditions of the vulnerability dimensions.  
c) Step 6 (optional): “Replay” of vulnerability 
assessment for each scenario 
For each scenario, the “what if?” question will be 
asked to consider the changes it would cause to 
each dimension of vulnerability. Physical 
evolution of hazards and exposure components 
must be considered, as well as social, 
demographic and economic response to the 
scenarios. 
For each dimension, indicator values will be 
calculated or re-assessed, then combined. It will 
be very important to use the same methodology 
as the first vulnerability assessment (steps 2, 3 
and 4).  
At this stage, this method does not consider the 
cost/efficiency ratio of the different scenarios. 
This last approach belongs to the stakeholders in 
charge of risk management, which can be very 
“case” dependant (available funding, human risk, 
willingness to anticipate, cope or restore). 
d) Step 7 (optional): compare the 
vulnerability assessments resulting from 
different strategies 
Building strategic scenarios and doing a “replay” 
of vulnerability assessments will allow the 
working group to identify the best risk 
management plan to reducevulnerability or adapt 
to it and toimprove its efficiency.  
e) Step 8: Apply a risk management strategy 
This step is the responsibility of the decision 
making stakeholders but is the final aim of 
vulnerability assessment. It can be determined 
from the results of step 4, or adjusted in order to 
identify the best practice at the end of step 7.   
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4. Tool box 
The project MOVE gave the opportunity to 
MOVE researchers to gather and evaluate 
different tools that are commonly used in the 
process of risk management and vulnerability 
assessments.  
Use of the different tools has been validated in 
different case studies. Figure 13 summarises 
which case study used which tool (ref. DVD) 
Developing and combining indicators is the core 
tool of MOVE, which allows the assessment of 
vulnerability using indicators. Data collection and 
treatment, spatialization, treatment of 
uncertainty, up and down scaling and of course, 
methods for stakeholders involvement are also 
necessary tools in risk assessments (first circle 
of Figure 14). 
Other steps are optional and may be used if the 
assessment objective is to develop risk 
governance (outside circle of Figure 14).  
All tools are shortly described in this manual and 
a selection of references to go further is 
provided. The tools are more extensively 
described in the guidelines for development of 
methods for a vulnerability assessment, and their 
application to different case studies can be found 
enclosed in the jointed DVD. 
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Figure 13: Application of methods and tools in different case studies. 
 
Figure 14: MOVE Vulnerability Assessment tools: VA core tools (dark orange),  
complimentary tools (light orange), optional tools (purple). 
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4.1. CORE TOOLS: METHODS FOR DEVELOPING AND COMBINING INDICATORS 
 
The core tools of the vulnerability assessment 
are designed to deliver the indicators or 
elements that can be measured or calculated, 
and to survey and assess the various 
components of vulnerability and risk. 
The ability to measure or assess vulnerability 
and risk is a prerequisite for reducing disaster 
risk or adapting to it. The development of 
indicators and composite indicators to assess 
vulnerability is increasingly recognized as a 
useful tool for measuring and surveying 
vulnerability and also for policy making and 
public communication. Most indicators reflect 
approximately reality (“proxies”). Indicators may 
be a qualitative (nominal), a rank (ordinal), or a 
quantitative (interval) variable. The quality of 
indicators is determined by how reality is 
translated into indicators, which also depends on 
the underlying data used.  
The most important quality criteria for indicators 
and indicator development are that the indicator 
is: 
 Measurable,  
 Relevant to the objectives: assessing an issue 
that is appropriate to thetopic, 
 Policy-relevant, 
 Measuring only important key-elements 
instead of trying to indicate all aspects, 
 Analytically and statistically sound, 
 Understandable, 
 Easy to interpret, 
 Sensitive and specific to the underlying 
phenomenon, 
 Valid and accurate, 
 Reproducible, 
 Based on available data, 
 Comparable with other data (across areas 
and/or over time), 
 Cost effective, and 
 Not redundant. 
The following steps and issues (JRC-EC 2003) 
should be considered for the construction of 
composite indicators: (a) Theoretical framework; 
(b) Data selection; (c) Correlation analysis of 
data; (d) Standardization methods; (e) Weighting 
approaches; (f) Country groupings; (g) Sensitivity 
tests; (h) Transparency/ accessibility; and (i) 
Visualization. 
A mathematical combination (or aggregation) of 
a set of indicators is called an index or composite 
indicator. They are based on sub-indicators that 
may not have any common meaningful unit of 
measurement. There are no standard 
procedures for weighting and summarising these 
sub-indicators. Composite indicators are much 
easier to interpret than trying to find a common 
trend in many separate indicators. However, they 
can send misleading or non-robust policy 
messages if they are poorly constructed or 
misinterpreted.  
Several methods for the aggregation of 
indicators can be used. A vulnerability 
assessment encompasses: (i) the aggregation of 
indicators in different dimensions of vulnerability, 
such as physical, social, environmental, cultural, 
economic and institutional, (ii) the synthesis or 
aggregation of these dimensions to the factors of 
vulnerability (exposure, susceptibility and 
resilience), and finally (iii) the combination of 
factors to estimate the overall vulnerability.  
Although science cannot provide an objective 
method for developing the one-and-only true 
composite indicator to summarize a complex 
system, it can help significantly in assuring that 
the process of aggregation is as reliable and 
transparent as possible. The steps to be followed 
in constructing composite indicators are to: 
 Define the phenomenon to be measured; 
 Select sub-indicators; 
 Check data availability; 
 Prepare data; 
 Assess relationships between sub-indicators 
and their statistical properties;  
 Normalize and weigh variables; 
 Test robustness and sensibility; 
 Visualize the composite indicator. 
Whenever indicators in a dataset are 
incomparable with each other, and/or have 
different measurement units, it is necessary to 
bring these indicators to the same standard by 
transforming them into dimensionless variables 
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to avoid comparing “apples and oranges”. By 
means of different normalization techniques, the 
comparability of several indicators is given. A 
number of methods exist, such as: ranking, 
standardization, min-max normalisation, distance 
to a reference, and categorical scale, among 
others. 
Construction of a composite indicator aims to 
combine, in a meaningful way, different 
dimensions measured on different scales. 
Weighting and aggregation of indicators is then 
essential. This implies a choice of a weighting 
model to be used and of the procedure or 
method to be applied, since there is no 
“universal recipe” for aggregating composite 
indicators 
A number of weighting techniques exist: some 
are derived from statistical models or from 
participatory methods. Examples of statistical 
weighting methods are: equal weighting, 
principal component analysis (PCA), factor 
analysis, multiple regression models, and the 
benefit of the doubt approach. Examples of 
participatory weighting methods are: expert 
judgment, public opinion, analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP), and conjoint analysis. Each 
method has advantages and disadvantages. 
Composite indicators can be the result of 
additive aggregation, geometric aggregation, or 
of a multi-criteria decision approach.  
The above-mentioned methods are described in 
the MOVE guideline (refer to DVD). 
 
 
Text box 1: Physical risk index (IDEA, 2005), Carreño et al., 2007 and Marulanda et al., 2009). 
The physical risk index is an example of an aggregation of indicators.  
The available scenarios of damage potential, resulting from the convolution of hazard and physical 
vulnerability of buildings and infrastructure, are the basic information for this estimation. The primary 
indicators or descriptors are: damaged areas, fatalities, injured people, ruptures in water-pipe or gas 
networks, fallen lengths of HT power lines, telephone exchanges affected, etc. This choice will depend 
on the available information. 
The next step is to build transformation functions to normalize the indicators‟ gross values (XPhRi) and 
to transform them into comparable units (FPhRi). The normalized values are the factors of risk. The 
transformation functions give values between 0 and 1, describing the intensity of the risk for each 
descriptor.For example, the damaged built area, function (Figure 15) defines, according to the expert‟s 
opinion and based on existing loss evaluation, a minimum risk of (0) when the potentially damaged 
area descriptor is zero and a maximum risk of 1 when it is 20%. 
Then, the physical risk index, RPh, is evaluated as the weighted sum: 
p
i
PhRiPhRiPh FwR
1
 (1) 
where p is the total number of descriptors of physical risk considered in the analysis, FPhRi are the 
component factors, and wPhRi are their respective weights The weights wPhRi represent the relative 
importance of each factor and are calculated by means of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), which 
is used to derive ratio scales from both discrete and continuous paired comparisons (Saaty, 2001). 
Figure 16 shows the results of the application of this methodology to the city of Bogota, Colombia.  
Assessing vulnerability to natural hazards in Europe: from principles to practice  
Manual on methods and concepts 
 25  
 
 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
Damaged area   P[0 20] (%  Damaged area / Total area) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
Fatalities  P[0 50]  (Fatalities per 1000 inhabitants) 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
Injured people  P[0 75] (Injured people per 1000 inhabitants)  
Figure 15: Examples of transformation functions used to standardize the physical risk factors. 
  
Figure 16 : Bogotá, Colombia: a) Potential damage scenario and b) Physical risk index, RPh. 
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4.2. COMPLEMENTARY TOOLS AND METHODS 
 
The hereunder described tools are to be used at 
different steps in the procedure. The proposed 
methods were not specifically built for risk and 
vulnerability assessments, but they are 
necessary to enhance the robustness of the 
analysis. 
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4.2.1. Stakeholders involvement 
The involvement of stakeholders is a prerequisite 
to guarantee not only an appropriate model 
according to the needs of the end-users (i.e. 
stakeholders), but also the acceptance of the 
vulnerability assessment model and its 
implementation. 
a) The importance of stakeholders 
involvement in the process 
The process of a vulnerability assessment will 
certainly be more efficient and lead to more 
satisfying results if public and/or private parties, 
who are legally responsible for decision-making, 
or key-stakeholders responsible for the 
implementation, are represented in the process 
from the beginning (Wanczura, 2010). When 
completing a vulnerability assessment according 
to the MOVE generic framework, stakeholder 
involvement is considered as the first step. This 
manual even suggests the appropriation of the 
MOVE methods by stakeholders, so that they 
can lead the assessment procedure with the 
help of a working group that gathers practitioners 
and stakeholders. 
However, the selection of appropriate 
stakeholders is not easy and may be a 
challenge. Who are the appropriate stakeholders 
for a given case? Who is the appropriate leader? 
How can stakeholders be motivated to 
participate? What kind of benefits does their 
participation offer (for the process and for the 
stakeholders themselves)? How can they be 
involved?  
b) Level of participation 
The involvement of stakeholders is commonly 
categorized into five levels of “participation” 
according to the requirements of the 
process/model:  
 “do nothing”: there is no integration of 
stakeholders and/or no communication 
between stakeholders and the involved 
authority (scientific institution, or policy 
maker);“information” is a one-way 
communication, where the interests of other 
groups (e.g. the public) are not the focus of 
communication,  
 “consultation” is a two-way communication, 
where information is supplied to the 
stakeholders, and the demands, interests and 
fears of the involved society and the 
stakeholders are considered,  
 “cooperation” goes beyond consultation; here, 
the stakeholders are actively involved in the 
process to a certain extent,  
 “involvement / collaboration” is a two-way 
communication, where the involvement of all 
parties is shared (involvement is the most 
active method of communication during the 
process).  
The appropriate degree of stakeholder 
involvement should be chosen in accordance 
with the level of the process (e.g. risk 
governance) and the necessity. It should be kept 
in mind that not every stage of a process 
demands intensive involvement of stakeholders.  
Some parts of the process are quite scientific or 
theory based and far away from the day-to-day 
business of the stakeholders. These parts may 
lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
of the results. Therefore – especially in parts 
requiring the active involvement of the 
stakeholders – it is important to use basic 
language that “covers” the already mentioned 
day-to-day business). Complex issues should be 
broken down into issues that reflect their 
relevance (from theory to practice). Here, 
appropriate and simple examples are more 
effective than complicated explanations. 
Several experiences during the European INCA 
project (Linking Civil Protection and Planning by 
Agreement on Objectives, www.project-inca.eu) 
highlighted the necessity of cooperation and 
involvement of stakeholders during the planning 
process. From this project, some rules have 
been developed that also can be used to apply 
the MOVE generic conceptual framework: 
 It is a long-term perspective; 
 The necessity and benefits of the cooperation 
between stakeholders and practitioners is to 
be highlighted, and the working group will be 
composed of stakeholders and practitioners 
(scientists, contractors…); 
 The stakeholders‟ involvement is an active 
and important part of the concept; therefore, 
an official leader is committed to the project 
and/or a key executive role is assigned to the 
volunteers; 
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 Implication of stakeholders can be at different 
levels in the assessment procedure. The 
working group members will have different 
degrees of decision: the cooperation must 
lead to little additional work apart for the 
leader; 
 Feedback from the working group is 
necessary to help to frame the objectives or 
the context of the process, and to see to its 
implementation; 
 The agreed upon objectives and measures will 
be assessed for (technical or financial) 
feasibility and applicability: re-framing the 
objectives during the course of the 
assessment will have to be validated by the 
working group; the working group might then 
need the input of new administrative 
competencies and procedures; 
 The workshops will take place regularly and 
will gain in efficiency if accommodated by a 
“third” (“neutral”) person/institution/ party; the 
results and the agreements of the meetings 
are fixed in minutes and are circulated to all 
participants (additional documents like maps, 
figures, further information, etc. might 
constitute a significant part of the minutes). 
For further details: 
Wanczura S. (2010). Raumplanung und „Risk 
Governance‟ – Indikatorensystem zur Messung einer 
effektiven und effizienten Koordination im „Risk 
Governance‟ Prozess. Dissertation. Dortmund. 
 
4.2.2. Data mining 
The data mining process starts at the beginning 
of the assessment, after the initial data 
identification, to question the feasibility, scale 
and objective of the assessment. Data collecting, 
treatment and mining will then be necessary to 
develop indicators. The large amount of 
available data in many scientific fields makes a 
manual exploration of this data impossible.
Data mining can be defined as the process of 
selecting, exploring and modelling large 
databases in order to discover models and 
patterns that were not known previously (Giudici, 
2003). In other words, data mining is an in-depth 
search to find additional information that 
previously went unnoticed in the mass of 
available data (Giudici, 2003).  
The main goals of data mining are description 
and prediction (Fayyad et al., 1996). Description 
consists of finding patterns that describe the 
data, and prediction involves the prediction of 
unknown or future values by using existing data. 
Data mining is a step of the process described 
by Fayyad et al. (1996) as the KDD (Knowledge 
Discovery in Database) (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17: The KDD Process, highlighting the data mining step (modified from Fayyad et al., 1996). 
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a) Data mining methods 
The goals of data mining can be achieved with a 
number of methods. Some of the most common 
data mining methods (Fayyad et al., 1996) 
include: 
 Clustering: identification of set of categories 
and clusters to describe the data, 
 Classification: classification of data in 
predefined classes, 
 Regression: developing a function 
representative of the data, 
 Summarisation: finding a compact description 
for a sub-set of data, 
 Dependency modelling: developing models 
that describe dependencies (relationships) 
among variables, 
 Change and deviation detection: this method 
highlights changes in comparison with 
previous measurements of the data. 
All these methods are supported by a range of 
available software for data mining. A selection of 
software can be found at the website: 
www.kdnuggets.com. 
b) Applications 
Data mining is being used in many different 
sectors such as business (marketing 
improvement, sale increase), medicine, 
insurance, and intelligence agencies (Seifert 
2004). There are also numerous applications of 
data mining of spatial data. As far as vulnerability 
assessment is concerned, theoretically, data 
mining can be used for all of the components of 
vulnerability. Data mining is often used for the 
analysis of demographic and socioeconomic 
data, and will be of some help for social 
vulnerability assessments. 
c) Advantages 
The advantages of data mining are that it: 
  unearths information from existing data that 
was not previously known, 
 makes the data analysis process a lot faster, 
 offers great potential benefits for applied GIS-
based decision making, and 
 can be applied to very large datasets. 
d) Limitations 
Some of the weaknesses of data mining are 
listed below (Fayyad et al., 1996; Michalski & 
Kaufman, 1998; Wang, 2003): 
 Missing and incorrect data have to be dealt 
with before the actual data mining process. 
 Rapidly changing data shorten the validity of 
previously developed patterns. 
 Prior knowledge and “cleaning” of the data 
(identification and removal of unnecessary 
variables) is important to reduce the size of 
data sets. 
 The discovered patterns have to be made 
comprehensible by users. 
 Possible introduction of bias and inaccuracy 
due to human interpretations of qualitative 
data. 
 The possible loss of context specific, 
qualitative information, diversity, and accuracy 
that can result from the necessary distillation 
and compression required by data mining. 
 
For further details: 
 
Fayyad U., Piatetsky-Shapiro G. & P. Smyth (1996): 
From data mining to knowledge discovery in 
databases. AI Magazine 17: 37-53. 
Giudici P. (2003): Applied data mining. Chichester, 
Wiley. 
Michalski R.S. & K.A. Kaufman (1998): Data mining 
and knowledge discovery: A review of issues and a 
multistrategy approach. In: Michalski R.S., Bratko I. 
&M. Kubat (eds.): Machine learning and data mining: 
Methods and applications. London, John Wiley & 
Sons: 71-122. 
Seifert J.W. (2004): Data Mining: an Overview. CRS 
Report for Congress, RL31798. Congressional 
Research Service, the Library of Congress. Wang J. 
(2003): Data mining: Opportunities and challenges. 
London, IRM Press. 
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4.2.3. Treatment of uncertainty 
Elements of risk are pervaded with significant 
uncertainty: it involves assessment of the 
consequences of a hazard on a society a 
system, a territory and Response to the hazard 
is dependent on many dimensions of fragility and 
capacity to cope, recover or adapt. Neglecting 
uncertainties can lead to unsafe estimates of 
vulnerability and risk.  
Uncertainty may be classified as: 
 Random (aleatory uncertainty): It represents 
the “real” variability of the physical 
environment, such as the variability of 
weather. In the domain of vulnerability 
assessment, such uncertainties can 
correspond to, for instance, the height of 
buildings in a town district or the income per 
capita of persons living in a target area. This 
type of uncertainty cannot be reduced.  
 Knowledge-based, (epistemic uncertainty): 
This uncertainty is “artificial” in that it stems 
from limited knowledge, measurement 
capability and modelling capability on the part 
of the analyst. This type of uncertainty can be 
reduced by, for example, increasing the 
number of tests, improving the measurement 
methods or verifying model tests. 
Making this differentiation is useful in practice, 
because decisions motivated by random 
uncertainties will be quite different from decisions 
based on knowledge-based uncertainties.  
 If uncertainty is due to a likely variability, then 
concrete actions can be taken to circumvent 
the potentially dangerous effects of such 
variability.(eg: as the increase the height of 
dykes, taking in accountthe temporal 
variations in the storm surge frequency and 
magnitude to prevent marine inundation. 
If uncertainty is due to incomplete information, 
the best solution is to set priorities for data / 
analysis process, with budget constraints, on the 
basis of the identification of the most influential 
sources of knowledge-based uncertainties. 
The classification can be refined by 
categorization of the uncertainties with reference 
to the stage in which they are included in the 
vulnerability assessment. Figure 18 proposes a 
classification system for the treatment of 
uncertainties in vulnerability assessments based 
on the modelling process steps: “Input/Data”, 
“Model/Procedure” and “Output”.The 
parameters are: 
 Qualitative: the magnitude of the parameters 
is described verbally; no numerical categorical 
or quantitative value associated with the 
verbal description; 
 Categorical (semi-quantitative): the magnitude 
of the parameters is expressed on a 
quantitative, purposely defined ordinal scale; 
 Quantitative: the magnitude of the parameters 
is expressed on a quantitative, measurable 
scale. 
Parameter uncertainty, associated with the 
input parameters, is commonly recognized and 
addressed in modelling approaches. In general, 
parameter uncertainty is partly aleatoric and 
partly epistemic. 
Models / procedures can be classified as 
implicit or explicit according to the following 
description: 
 Implicit: Aggregation of inputs occurs 
subjectively, based on expert judgment; 
 Explicit: Aggregation of inputs relies on 
repeatable criteria, algorithms, models or 
formulae. 
Model/procedures uncertainties, are 
essentially epistemic in nature, and are an 
aggregation of: 
 Conceptual model uncertainty, concerning 
how the real world is represented and 
abstracted, and 
 Modelling uncertainty, concerning the 
underlying mathematical modelling and its 
inherent assumptions. 
Event uncertainty: relating to whether 
scenarios/events representing all potential 
hazards have been identified and analyzed. It is 
based on imagination of the future or on 
replaying a former event, and carries a high 
knowledge uncertainty. 
Uncertainty, in the final estimation of risk, is the 
aggregation of all these types of uncertainties. 
Each type is represented using appropriate 
mathematical tools according to the available 
data and information and to the experts‟ 
judgments and previous experience.  
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Figure 18: Proposed classification system for vulnerability estimation. 
 
The estimation of uncertainties is usually a 
difficult and costly exercise. Hence, the level of 
complexity and sophistication, and the effort and 
resources (time, budget, and technical means) to 
be spent should be chosen, provided that it is 
relevant to the risk management issue. 
Figure 19 illustrates four different levels of 
sophistication to support decision-making with 
uncertainties, from the simplest “worse-case 
scenario” approach (case A) to the most 
sophisticated approach based on the setof all 
distributions, each of them being associated with 
a statement of confidence accounting for the lack 
of knowledge (case D). In all cases, the 
information these results provide (or cannot 
provide) should be kept in mind when making 
decisions or policies, in addition to how this 
information can be used to support decision-
making regarding the risk issues at stake. (Paté-
Cornell, 1996). 
 
Figure 19: Illustration of four different levels of uncertainty evaluations to support decision-making. 
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The different levels of complexity shown in 
Figure 19could be illustrated by a concrete 
example of a potential event, such as a 
landslide: 
 The landslide can kill up to 10% of the 
population in the area. (Worst-case scenario), 
 The landslide will probably kill about 3% of the 
population in the area. (Most frequent 
outcome); 
 The landslide will probably kill about 3% of the 
population in the area, with a variation 
between 0% and 6%, but up to 10% of the 
population could be killed. (The probability 
distribution of vulnerability is described); 
 The same information as in C). This 
information has a confidence of 75%. The 
confidence is not 100% due to a lack of 
knowledge. Based on the same input data, an 
alternative description, could be: The landslide 
would probably kill about 2,5% of the 
population in the area, with a variation 
between 0% and 5%, but in worst case, 9% of 
the population could be killed. Families of 
probability distributions of vulnerability, with 
different confidence levels are described. 
 
Text box 2: Expert judgment 
The use of information originating from human experts is of primary importance for vulnerability 
assessments, especially where data and information are scarce. Formal uses of Expert judgment 
involve a deliberate attempt to bring out the assumptions and reasoning underlying the judgment, to 
quantify it to a useful extent, and to document it so that it can be evaluated by others. The following 
steps describe the process of formal Expert judgment elicitation (adapted from Otway and Winterfeld, 
1992): 
 Identify and select the events and options about which fact or value judgements should be made 
formally; 
 Identify and select the experts who will make the judgments; 
 Define the issues for which judgments are to be elicited and identify the relevant experts in the fields; 
 Train the experts to the rules of the methodology for the elicitation of formal judgments (i.e. elicitation 
methods, decomposition approaches, bias identification and debiasing technique); 
 Elicit the Expert judgments in interviews with a trained facilitator, who poses questions to properly 
separate the main problem in sub-problems to be discussed, to elicit judgments (through for instance 
a brainstorming session), and to cross-check result against other forms of judgement; 
 Analyse and aggregate results obtained from individual experts and, in the case of substantial 
disagreements, attempt to resolve differences; 
 Completely document results, including the reasoning given by the experts to support their 
judgement. 
For further details 
Paté-Cornell, M.E., 1996. Uncertainties in risk 
analysis: Six levels of treatment. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 54 (1996) 95-I 1 I. 
Otway, H., Winterfeldt D., 1992. Expert judgment in 
risk analysis and management: process, context and 
pitfalls. Risks Analysis 12(1). p. 83-93. 
4.3. SCALING METHODS 
 
4.3.1. Definition 
Scale is a concept used to observe, 
characterize and link entities, patterns, and 
processes. There are two spatial 
representations: absolute and relative points of 
view:  
 Absolute scales deal with aggregated data, 
and they explain the effects of scale through 
statistical inferences and models.  
 Relative scales allow the identificationand 
association of spatial patterns and processes 
at different scales (Marceau, 1999). 
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4.3.2. Methods 
Scaling methods are an important tool in 
processing data and collecting indicators for 
vulnerability assessments. These methods 
allow transferring data or information through 
time and space and combining data needed for 
assessing vulnerability. Up-scaling, also called 
aggregation, increases information per area 
(referred to as support, grain or resolution). 
Decreasing information per area is called 
down-scaling or disaggregation (Bierkens et al., 
2000).  
Vulnerability assessors can employ specific 
methods for scaling both quantitative and 
qualitative data. Scaling supports the transfer of 
quantitative data or information from different 
scales, but also from different spatial reference 
systems such as:  
 administrative data (e.g. NUTS 1-5), 
 remote sensing data (e.g. Satellite grids), 
 remote sensing products (e.g. CORINE 
landcover), 
 risk or hazard zonings, 
 catchment areas, and 
 weather and climate data.  
Specific scaling methods combine vector data 
(e.g. administrative or geographical units) with 
raster data (e.g. remote sensing data). When 
adding ancillary data (other than remote 
sensing) in order to approximate data 
distribution, scaling tools help to localize data 
more precisely in space.  
Three processes are used in MOVE to examine 
methods applied to qualitative data and 
information. Those data are nominal (such as 
gender or socio-professional category), ordinal 
(rank ordering) or interval (based on a metric): 
 Qualitative indicators (are scaled up or 
down); 
 Qualitative data is transposed to a higher or 
lower scale and could be used in indicators; 
 Qualitative data collection methodologies are 
used at multiple scales within a single policy 
or analytical project. 
Applications of quantitative aggregation, 
disaggregation and transformation between 
administrative and non-administrative units 
(Raze, 2001) allows:  
 aggregation of administrative units (e.g. 
NUTS) into new units; 
 aggregation of data from finer to coarser 
administrative units (e.g. NUTS3 into 
NUTS2); 
 disaggregation (refinement) of data from 
coarser to finer administrative units or into 
non-administrative units; 
 transformation ofinformation e.g. from NUTS 
units to non-NUTS units; 
 precise localization of data in space using 
ancillary information.  
In the natural risk assessment context, relevant 
non-administrative units can be catchment 
areas, risk and hazard zones, topographical or 
meteorological spatial units and satellite grid, 
etc. 
4.3.3. Limits and recommendations 
Scaling is a potentially powerful tool in 
collecting and processing data for vulnerability 
assessments, but its application is not trivial. 
The choice of up/downscaling methods 
depends highly on the nature of the problem, 
as well as on the data availability and quality; 
scale dependency of data must also be 
considered (Rase, 2001). If these precautions 
are ignored, incorrect assumptions and 
misinterpretations of mapping results can 
happen easily due to common difficulties and 
gaps in scaling methods, which can lead to 
faulty decision making.  
Data availability and confidentiality or privacy 
issues can create additional problems in data 
bases. Downscaling methods are only 
applicable when they are based on solid data.  
Examples of Steinocher et al. (2006) and 
Gallego and Peedell (2001) (see text box 3, 
figure 20) demonstrate a way of improving the 
database with the use of ancillary information.  
Limitations also arise due to scaling effects 
(e.g. MAUP or Ecological Fallacy) or problems 
associated with scale boundaries, such as 
disparities in chosen units, or derive from 
possible ethical issues on qualitative data. 
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Text box 3 : Example of up and down scaling of population data 
Steinocher et al. (2006) and Gallego and Peedell (2001) combine complementary data on land cover 
from CORINE, derived from remote sensing, with population data available at different NUTS levels for 
spatial disaggregation. Using ancillary data, they refine the population density data, demonstrating a 
practical way to tackle the modified aerial unit problem (MAUP). Population data often only exist in an 
aggregated form for entire NUTS regions at different scales, whereas they are needed at finer spatial 
resolution for more detailed analyses.  
Steinocher et al. (2006) use CORINE Landcover data in housing areas to localize more precisely 
statistical population data in different NUTS regions. They assume that the population lives only in 
housing areas. This allows the estimation of the real population distribution in the case study region. 
Shortcomings of this assumption stem from low resolution satellite data. Difficulties in observing small 
settlements in rural and mountain areas and a lack of information on building heights (and therefore 
occupancy) cause an underestimation of the population in rural and urban areas and an overestimation 
of the population in urban outskirts. Gallego and Peedell (2001) reduce this effect by attributing 
different percentages of population to land cover classe additional tests are necessary for sites with 
different settlement styles.  
 
Figure 20: Example of scaling population information in Arezzo (Italy) (Gallego and Peedell, 2011). 
a) Population density by commune, b) CORINE Land Cover with simplified legend, c) Population density after 
refinement. NUTS 2, communes (Gallego, Peedell, 2001), NUTS 3 (Steinocher, 2006) (vector),Ancillary data: CORINE 
Land cover remote sensing derived data(vector). 
 
For further details 
Bierkens, M., Finke, P., De Willigen, P. 2000. 
Upscaling and Downscaling Methods for 
Environmental Research, Dordrecht  
Gallego, J., Peedell, S. 2001. Using CORINE land 
cover to map population density. In: Towards agri-
environmental indicators. Integrating statistical and 
administrative data with land cover. Joint pubblication: 
Eurostat, DG Agriculture, DG Environment, Joint 
Research Center, European Environment Agency. 
Rase, D. 2001. Dealing with the modifiable areal unit 
problem. In: Towards agri-environmental indicators. 
Integrating statistical and administrative data with land 
cover information. Joint pubblication: Eurostat, DG 
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Agriculture, DG Environment, Joint Research Center, 
European Environment Agency. 
Steinnocher, K., Weichselbaum J. and Köstl M., 2006: 
Linking Remote Sensing and Demographic Analysis 
in Urbanised Areas. Proc.: 1st EARSeL Workshop of 
the SIG Urban Remote Sensing Humboldt-Universität 
zu Berlin, 2-3 March 2006. 
Marceau, D. J. 1999. The scale issue in social and 
natural sciences. In: The Canadian Journal of Remote 
Sensing, 25, 347-356. 
 
4.4. SPATIALIZATION: INTEGRATION OF GEOINFORMATION IN A VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
 
Vulnerability changes in space and time, putting 
people and places under different degrees of risk 
(Bob, 2007). Depending on the type of disaster, 
the spatial component of the event can be 
identified. It is delineated clearly in the case of 
floods or debris flow events, but becomes more 
ill-defined for other types of disasters, such as 
droughts or heat waves.  
However, all of these events include a spatial 
(and temporal) component of vulnerability. 
Depending on the dimension of vulnerability and 
on the chosen approach (quantitative versus 
qualitative), geoinformation is an important pre-
requisite to be included in vulnerability 
assessments to allow spatial modelling, 
identification and visualisation. Geography 
contributes to the vulnerability assessment by 
introducing the concepts of scale, spatial 
analysis, geographic information and the 
methodical study of physical and human 
processes (Thomas, Ertugay & Kemec, 2007). 
Methods and tools established in GIScience, 
Remote Sensing/Earth Observation are to be 
used throughout different steps of a vulnerability 
and risk assessment.  
The main objectives include (Figure 21): 
 Acquisition of data to develop indicators and to 
monitor them spatially and temporarily (e.g. 
land cover data as input for certain 
vulnerability indicators, location of critical 
infrastructure, etc.), 
 Management of different spatial datasets, as 
well asproviding access to them (e.g. 
establishment of data on portalsfrom earth 
observation and from socio-economic 
datasets for standardization issues), 
 Analysis and exploration of datasets to 
generate new information (e.g. combination of 
land cover data and population data to 
produce a precise map of the population 
distribution; development of new indicators 
through spatial analysis, such as distance 
analysis, statistical analysis and integration of 
data, etc.), 
 Integration of indicators/data toward a holistic 
vulnerability approach (e.g. modelling of a 
vulnerability index vs. single indicator 
approaches),  
 Communication and visualisation of the 
modelling results with maps or web-based 
portals, as well asdecision support tools for 
different user domains. 
Cutter (2003) summarised the main issues within 
GIScience as spatial data acquisition and 
integration, distributed computing, dynamic 
representation of physical and human 
processes, knowledge of geographic 
information, interoperability, scale, spatial 
analysis, uncertainty, and decision support 
systems.  
Cutter also has summarised major research 
needs in GIScience regarding disasters and 
emergency management. Targeting the topic of 
vulnerability, better integration of physical 
processes and social models is needed to 
enhance the prediction of hazard impacts. 
Furthermore, improvements in representations of 
risk and vulnerability, visual images that capture 
the spatial and temporal shifts in the risk and 
local vulnerability, and inherent uncertainty of the 
information being presented are essential 
research topics. Additionally, an open question is 
the daily and diurnal occupation of certain areas 
within cities. Cutter emphasizes closer 
collaboration with the community of users and 
proposes a bottom-up approach. These research 
needs are still relevant, especially in the context 
of conducting vulnerability assessments 
(Kienberger, 2007). 
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Figure 21: Opportunities for Geoinformation to be integrated in a vulnerability assessment. 
 
Following the items mentioned above, it 
becomes clear that the use of geoinformation is 
not only limited to tools and concrete methods, 
but has a strong influence throughout the design 
and implementation of vulnerability 
assessments. Traditionally, GIS and Remote 
Sensing methods have been applied to detect, 
monitor and model hazards. They also help 
identifying the relationship of the physical 
dimension of hazard with its vulnerability, in a 
close to the (e.g. Flood hydrological modelling, 
etc.) and assessment of the built environment 
critical infrastructures).  
A more holistic approach toward the assessment 
of vulnerability is innovative. The successful 
integration of data, methods and tools within a 
vulnerability assessment, requires a strong 
dialogue with the user community to address 
their needs. Currently, the progress in innovation 
in GIScience and remote sensing is strongly 
increasing, and the application of related 
technologies is becoming ubiquitous in our daily 
lives. However, to implement such approaches 
successfully, it must be acknowledged that 
vulnerability has a spatial component. The 
applied methods and the results of such an 
integrated spatial assessment need to be 
communicated to decision makers in an 
appropriate way. GIScience and remote sensing 
provide the concepts, tools and methods to 
achieve this result. 
Environmental hazards and vulnerability 
conditions are dynamic entities in space and 
time.Therefore, they can be monitored effectively 
to a certain extent using remote sensing and GIS 
tools to develop suitable interventions and to 
allow the development of adaptation strategies. 
These actions will reduce exposure and 
susceptibility, and therefore,improve the 
resilience of the society. 
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Text box 4: Illustration of the spatialization tools 
GIS (Geographic Information System), as it is traditionally known, is a system of hardware, software, 
data, people, organizations and institutional arrangements for collecting, storing, analyzing, and 
disseminating information about areas of the earth (Figure 22). GIScience is the science that underlies 
GIS and their use, development, conceptualization and application. GIS allows the analysis of spatial 
data, such as spatial databases or location based services available on smart phones. It provides the 
methods and tools – often referred also as Geoinformatics. Geographic Information technologies are 
technologies for collecting and dealing with geographic information. This may include Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS), Remote Sensing and GIS.  
 
Figure 22: Primary components of a GIS. 
 
Figure 23 Examples of using GIScience in a vulnerability assessment. 
 
For further details 
Bob, B. (2007). Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Disaster 
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natural hazards on the provincial/community level in 
Mozambique: The contribution of GIScience and 
Remote Sensing. The 3
rd
 International Symposium on 
Geo-information for Disaster Management, Joint 
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R. Dynes (Eds.), Handbook of Disaster Research (pp. 
83 - 96). New York Springer 
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Text box 5: Illustration of the remote sensing tool 
Remote sensing is the science of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually 
being in contact with it. This is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and 
processing, analyzing, and applying this information. Remote sensing sensors can be installed on the 
ground or on a wide range of vehicles, for instance satellites or airplanes.  
There are two different basic principles of remote sensing: 
 Passive Remote Sensing, which makes use of sensors that detect the reflected or emitted electro-
magnetic radiation from natural sources; and  
 Active Remote Sensing, whichmuse of sensors that detect reflected responses from objects that are 
irradiated from artificially-generated energy sources, such as radar.  
Important characteristics of data from remote sensing sensors are the various types of resolution: 
 Spatial resolution: refers to the size of the smallest possible feature that can be detected. 
 Spectral resolution: describes the ability of the sensor to distinguish fine wavelength intervals. The 
finer the spectral resolution, the narrower the wavelength range for a particular channel or band. 
 Temporal resolution: refers to how often a remote sensing platform can provide coverage of an area. 
 Radiometric resolution: defines the sensitivity of a sensor to the magnitude of electromagnetic 
energy. 
 
Figure 24: Examples of using Remote Sensing within a vulnerability assessment. 
4.5. OPTIONAL METHODS 
 
4.5.1. Critical structures and failure 
propagation: Input-output 
inoperability Leontief model 
Critical infrastructure is the part of the socio-
economic system on which functions that sustain 
life, commerce and human activities depend. It is 
critical in the sense that the failure of any of its 
principal components can lead to secondary 
effects on other systems: e.g. loss of electrical 
power can compromise many systems from 
railways to traffic lights, and thus lead to 
progressive break-down of the socio-economic 
system.  
Critical infrastructure usually has weaknesses, or 
points of maximum vulnerability, which are 
especially susceptible to failure or represent 
points where failure would have the greatest 
consequences. 
A critical infrastructure is operationally defined as 
a complex system formed by its own structure, 
technologies and personnel. When it is 
temporarily interrupted it can significantly disturb a 
society at local, national and even international 
levels. In recent years, social and technological 
infrastructures have become increasingly complex 
by forming mutual dependencies and inter-
dependencies, especially due to the increasing 
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use of information technology and commu-
nications. Improvement in the quality of services 
and reduction in costs can lead to the emergence 
of new and unforeseen vulnerabilities. Closely 
linked infrastructures tend to be highly vulnerable 
to the propagation of failures. A failure in one part 
of the network can easily spread by a “domino 
effect” mechanism throughout the whole system, 
with impacts on its functionality and geography. 
This can amplify the effects and cause 
malfunctions and failures that affect even remote 
users, as may occur, for example, in a health 
system.  
The Wassily Leontief model, on the balance of 
economic systems, forms the basis of the input-
output model of inoperability (IIM Inoperability 
Input-Output Model) that was developed by 
Yacov, Haimes and Jiang (2001) and is used for 
complex infrastructure analysis.  
The application of this model to the description of 
complex systems, such as hospitals, aims to 
simulate their behaviour in the case of an 
external event or failure. The model carries out a 
vulnerability assessment that takes into 
consideration how a specific failure can influence 
the functionality of the whole system. 
Furthermore, this tool allows stakeholder 
opinions and experience to be taken into account 
and thus improves the reliability of the model of 
the system. 
The model mathematically describes a method 
for analysing the impact of an event (i.e. a 
failure) and its propagation to connected 
systems by estimating the impact of the initial 
event on the operations of the infrastructure. It 
takes into consideration the elements that make 
up the system, together with their mutual 
interdependencies. It does so by considering the 
direction of functional impacts (e.g.a element is 
essential to the performance of element b, but 
element a is not influenced by the operational 
level of element b). In other words, the model 
aims to analyse how the inoperability of one part 
of the system (i.e. its inability to perform tasks) is 
propagated to the other system elements. The 
model quantifies the subsequent inoperability of 
the infrastructure, where 'inoperability of a 
system' is defined as its inability to perform 
completely its proper functions. The inoperability 
is quantified as a value between zero and one, 
where zero corresponds to perfect performance 
at the operational level and one refers to 
complete ineffectiveness of the system (i.e. 
100% inoperability).  
The input-output model of Yacov, Haims and 
Jiang (2001) evaluates the risk of ineffectiveness 
of an infrastructure (xk) by combining the 
capacity to manage the risk for this infrastructure 
(ck) with the ineffectiveness on a linked 
infrastructure (xj), weighted by a coefficient (akj) 
that describes the interconnection between the 
infrastructures k and j: xj is a value between 0 
and 1.  
n
K
kjkjk cxax
1
 
In order to assess the weightings of inter-
connection between two infrastructures, two 
indexes are used:  
 dependency index, unique for each specific 
infrastructure. It provides a measure of the 
strength of the infrastructure compared to the 
inoperability of all the others. The dependency 
index is less than one if the infrastructure still 
preserves some operational capability in spite 
of the overall ineffectiveness of the system. In 
contrast, an index of inoperability greater than 
one indicates that the specific element or 
infrastructure is strongly dependent on the 
other elements or infrastructures and can be 
totally ineffective as a result of the ineffec-
tiveness of other elements, 
 index of influence gain.The influence gain 
provides a measure of how critical the 
services of the specific infrastructure are to the 
functionality of other system elements. A high 
index of dependency indicates that 
inefficiencies of a specific infrastructure, even 
when they are small, exert a strong influence 
and can lead to the inoperability of other 
infrastructures. A low value means that the 
ineffectiveness of the considered infrastructure 
has little effect on the operational capacity of 
the others.  
The interdependency term must consider any 
type of dependency between two or more 
infrastructures. Presently, the interdependencies 
are analysed by considering six different 
“dimensions”, which are the environment of the 
system, the type of interdependency (physical or 
functional, etc.), the operational level (under 
regular and failure conditions), the intrinsic 
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features (temporal and spatial scales, etc.) and 
the type of failure. This analysis aims to obtain 
the most useful elements for the characterization 
of dependency and the subsequent definition of 
weighting coefficients. 
 
Text box 6: Example of Léontieff model application to the MOVE Tuscany case 
The infrastructure is the AOU Careggi Florentine hospital, and the hazard is a seismic event of I=6. 
The application of the model consists of two main phases (Figure 25): 
 assessment of the “Input failures vector”, which is carried out by a seismic field assessment,  
 and definition of the interconnection coefficient by interviewing five experts at the Florence Health 
System (two medical doctors and three hospital engineers). 
Figure 26 reports the levels of inoperability according to each specific hospital unit. It underlines how 
the Emergency department is the most affected system, while the most dependent system is the 
Surgical department, and the most influential system is the power network. 
 
Figure 25: Application of the model to Florence hospital. 
 
Figure 26: Inoperability levels of different units of the hospital. 
 
One of the main approaches to analysing 
complex interdependencies in a model is 
“agent-based modelling”which is a “bottom-up” 
analysis. The modelling process includes the 
study of the behaviour of the individual 
components and the trajectory of the whole 
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system when these components start to 
interact. In this context, the individual 
components are defined as single entities 
characterised by location, capacity and 
memory. The location of an entity is defined as 
the physical space in which it is located. The 
capability of an entity expresses what it is able 
to do. The memory represents its current state 
and operational history, such as its age or 
propensity to overload.  
An alternative approach is based on building a 
knowledge base through the compilation of 
technical questionnaires. In particular, technical 
information is gathered through a series of 
questionnaires submitted to experts. By 
considering different durations of failure, the 
questions seek to understand the dynamics of 
failure propagation and the impact that failure in 
a specific infrastructure will have on the others. 
Hence, in order to ensure the correct 
interpretation of uncertain data, the 
methodology uses a fuzzy logic system that 
takes into consideration both the experience of 
the user and the degree of confidence placed in 
the answer. 
 
For further details  
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K.L., Reinert R.K. 2000. Aspen-EE: an Agent- Based 
Model of Infrastructure Interdependency. Sandia 
Report SAND.  
Bologna S., Casalicchio E. 2007. La Simulazione: uno 
strumento a supporto della protezione delle 
infrastrutture critiche. Safety & Security Journal (3).  
Commission of the European Communities: 
Communication from the Commission on a European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
COM(2006)786, 2006.  
Commission of the European Communities: Proposal 
for a Directive of the Council on the identification and 
designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
COM(2006) 787. Brussels, 12.12.2006. 
Department of Homeland Security. National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 2009 
Dubois, D. and Prade H 1998. Possibility Theory: an 
Approach to Computerized Processing of Uncertainty. 
Plenum Publishing Corporation. 
 
 
 
4.5.2. Building scenarios 
In the context of vulnerability, scenarios are 
defined by Kahn and Wiener (1967) as 
“hypothetical sequences of events, constructed 
for the purpose of focussing attention on causal 
processes and decision points”.The modern, 
formal method for constructing scenarios 
involves a kind of “socio-economic futurology” 
based on narrative processes that lead to the 
creation of possible alternative outcomes.  
Peterson et al. (2003) defined scenario planning 
as “a systemic method for thinking creatively 
about possible complex and uncertain futures”. 
The fundamental idea is to consider a variety of 
possible futures, in light of uncertainties about 
the future, rather than to attempt to predict a 
single outcome. The focus on accommodating 
uncertainty is fundamental to the scenario as 
both a concept and a methodology. 
In synthesis, scenario planning is an aid to 
decision making that offers a range of alternative 
futures and facilitates actions based on 
knowledge of uncontrollable uncertainty. 
Hereafter, rather than the optimization of 
decisions (Peterson et al.,2003) „hedging’ 
means “limiting or qualifying by introducing 
conditions or exceptions” (OED). 
Despite the emphasis on uncertainty, scenarios 
must strike a balance between continuity and 
surprise. High continuity and low surprise 
signifies hedging, but while scenario planning is 
more adventurous, and potentially more creative, 
it is also more difficult to verify and support with 
evidence. Nevertheless, the end product of 
scenario modelling must aim, if not for certainty, 
at least for consistency in trends, outcomes and 
stakeholder decisions. 
Whereas a prediction or forecast specifies the 
best estimate of an outcome, scenario methods 
involve creating a range of possible outcomes 
that represent the envelope of uncertainty. 
Moreover, good scenarios are a hybrid of 
exploratory and anticipatory approaches. 
Exploration involves seeking answers to 
questions by creative association of available 
data: anticipation means creating potential 
answers to future contingencies. 
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Scenario methods have been widely used for the 
assessment of hazards, risks and disasters. In 
particular, they have been employed for 
quantification of earthquake losses, assessment 
of seismic damage, reconstruction of the 
dynamics of past events and forecasting of the 
progress of anticipated future ones (Barbat et al. 
1996; Moharram et al., 2008). In addition to 
natural hazard studies, scenarios have been 
applied in civil protection training (Alexander, 
2000), emergency planning (Walker, 1995) and 
disaster management (Sagun et al., 2009). 
Vulnerability scenarios have seldom been 
constructed explicitly, but vulnerability is usually 
a key elementin the basic conceptual equation: 
HazardxVulnerability[/exposure ]→Risk→Impact 
In this context, a scenario should not be a 
narrative of an event but a flexible model of what 
has happened or what is expected to happen, 
involving a range of possible outcomes-the 
„envelope‟ mentioned above. 
Scenarios of events yet to happen are not about 
predicting what is to come, but are about seeing 
in the past aspects of a possible future. Like 
most scientific models, they involve simplification 
of complex realities in ways that are intended to 
make them more understandable. Hence, there 
is an element of selectivity in the construction 
and use of scenarios. They must discriminate in 
the choice of facts and phenomena that they 
make use of. This is how they reduce complexity 
to a manageable level. 
In the emergencies and disasters field, a 
scenario will answer the question “what if...?” 
However, the problem with projecting reality 
hypothetically into the future is that, due to the 
presence of random and unforeseeable 
elements, what eventually transpires cannot be 
predicted exactly. Thus, the correct way to use 
scenarios is as a means of throwing light upon 
some of the things that could conceivably 
happen. This should be done using degrees of 
freedom and confidence intervals. For example, 
aggregate patterns of human behaviour differ 
over time, particularly according to diurnal 
rhythms. Hence, whatever the nature of the 
damage that occurs, such as the impact of an 
earthquake on humans, is likely to be different at 
night than during the daytime, with additional 
variations between a working day and a holiday. 
Planning scenarios, including those that deal 
with vulnerability assessment and reduction, will 
involve a reference event. This is usually taken 
to be the largest, most important or most well-
documented extreme natural hazard of a certain 
kind that has occurred in the historical past. 
These events are usually in the recent past since 
this means that scientific records of it are likely to 
be available. The reference event is adapted to 
modern conditions (for example, taking into 
account changes in demography, urbanization, 
infrastructure and lifestyle) and rerun for a variety 
of circumstances that represent the envelope of 
possible future conditions. The use of systems 
theory allows the process of projecting the 
scenario into the future to be treated as one of 
the inputs, throughputs, transformation, 
subsystems and outputs, which enables it to be 
a more formal and rigorous process. The 
outcomes, in terms of details of possible 
impacts, can be treated as indications of how 
best to allocate resources for the purposes of 
reducing vulnerability to the hazard for which the 
scenario is constructed. 
Until the next hazard impact occurs, verification 
of future scenarios is difficult. However, one can 
at least check the work for consistency and 
ensure that it is congruent and based on 
assumptions that are both reasonable and 
acceptable to people who will use the work. 
 
For further details 
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Damage scenarios simulation for seismic risk 
assessment in urban zones. Earthquake Spectra 
12(3): 371-394. 
Kahn, H. and A.J. Wiener 1967. The Year 2000: A 
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Walker, W.E. 1995. The Use of Scenarios and 
Gaming in Crisis Management Planning and Training. 
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 11 p. 
 
4.5.3. Comprehensive Approach for 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(CAPRA) 
This model, built for earthquake risk 
management, allows the evaluation of 
probabilistic losses on exposed elements using 
probabilistic metrics, such as: 
 the exceedance probability curve, or  
 expected annual loss and probable maximum 
loss.  
CAPRA (Comprehensive Approach for 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment) has been 
developed and used in different countries with 
the technical and financial support of the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the International Strategy of United 
Nations for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). It is a 
techno-scientific methodology and information 
platform, which is useful for multi-hazard/risk 
analyses and is composed of tools for the 
evaluation and communication of risk at various 
territorial levels.  
The platform is conceptually oriented to facilitate 
decision making and to design risk transfer 
instruments.The evaluation of probabilistic cost-
benefit ratios provides a tool for decision makers 
to analyse the net benefits of risk mitigation 
strategies, such as building retrofitting. This tool 
is useful for land use planning, loss scenarios for 
emergency response, early warning systems, 
on-line loss assessment mechanisms, and 
holistic evaluations of disaster risk, based on 
indicators that facilitate the integrated risk 
management by stakeholders involved in risk 
reduction decision-making.  
It is built as a sequence of modules that 
quantifies potential losses arising from 
earthquake events (shown in the Figure 27): 
 
 
Figure 27: Probabilistic risk model and disaster risk management applications  
such as the holistic risk evaluation using indicators. 
 
Hazard Module Exposure Module
Risk Retention and 
Financial Risk Transfer
Damage & Loss 
Module (Risk)
Vulnerability Module
Cost-Benefit Analysis for 
Prevention / Mitigation
Holistic Risk Evaluation 
(Indicators)
Land Use Planning & 
Zoning
Emergency Response 
Scenarios & Planning
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 The hazard module of CAPRA defines the 
frequency and severity of a hazardous event, 
at a specific location, if the information about 
the phenomenon, is available. This is 
completed by analysing the historical event 
frequencies and reviewing scientific studies 
performed on the severity and frequencies of 
such events in the region of interest. Once the 
hazard parameters are established, stochastic 
event sets, defining the frequency and severity 
of thousands of stochastic events, are 
generated.. In the case of earthquakes, 
tsunami, hurricanes, floods, and landslides, 
the modules can analyse the intensity at a 
location once an event in the stochastic set 
has occurred. The effects of the event at the 
site under consideration are modelled, and the 
propensity of local site conditions to either 
amplify or reduce the impact is evaluated. 
Hazards are expressed in terms of the 
exceedance rates of given values of intensity.  
 The exposure values of “assets at risk” are 
estimated either from available secondary 
data sources, such as existing databases, or 
they are derived from simplified procedures 
based on general macro-economic and social 
information such as population density, 
construction statistics or more specific 
information. This “proxy” approach is used 
when the preferred specific site data are not 
available. Based on the information available, 
an input data base is constructed using GIS, 
and specific required information is completed 
using, for example, internet data gathering 
tools. The exposure can be developed also 
using remote sensing images and the 
digitalization of polygons, lines, and points 
using drawing tools. 
 Vulnerability functions describe loss in a 
proper manner for risk calculation. This type of 
curve has been used extensively worldwide. 
Physical states are qualitative and merely 
descriptive of the expected damage. For 
rigorous loss calculations, a numerical 
damage cost scale must be related to the 
defined damage states, for example in terms 
of the ratio of repair cost to replacement value. 
CAPRA also allows for the use of customized 
vulnerability models in different formats. 
Specific vulnerability curves can be defined for 
building contents and for business interruption 
costs. 
Curves of loss can be generated for different 
risks measuring parameters such as the 
probable maximum loss or the number of 
fatalities or injured people as a function of the 
return period. On the other hand, in addition to 
the probabilistic economic figures, it is also 
relevant for disaster management and 
vulnerability reduction to have the earthquake 
loss scenarios from a deterministic perspective, 
considering some historical events. Figure 28 
shows a map of a city using the damage and 
loss module, using high resolution homogeneous 
areas. 
Considering the possibility of future highly 
destructive events, risk estimation has to focus 
on models that can use the limited available 
information to predict best future scenarios and 
to consider the high uncertainty involved in the 
analysis. Since large uncertainties are inherent in 
models estimating event severity and frequency 
characteristics, in addition to the consequent 
losses caused by such events, the risk model of 
CAPRA is based on formulations that 
incorporate this uncertainty into the hazard and 
risk assessment. 
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Figure 28: Example of economical ($) average annual loss in a city using homogeneous areas,  
calculated using CAPRA. 
 
The CAPRA, developed as an open source 
platform, provides different type of users with 
tools, capabilities, information and data to 
evaluate disaster risk. CAPRA applications 
include: 
 sets of software modules for the different 
types of hazards considered,  
 a standard format for exposure of different 
components of infrastructure,  
 a vulnerability module with a library of 
vulnerability curves, and  
 an exposure, hazard and risk mapping 
geographic information system.  
Probabilistic techniques of CAPRA employ 
statistical analysis of historical datasets to 
simulate hazard intensities and frequencies 
across aterritory. This hazard information can 
then be combined with data on exposure and 
vulnerability of the cities, and spatially analysed 
to estimate the resulting potential damage. This 
measure can then be quantified by risk metrics, 
such as a probable maximum loss for any given 
return period or an average annual loss. Since 
this risk is quantified according to a rigorous 
methodology, users have access toa common 
language for measuring, comparing or 
aggregating expected losses from various 
hazards, even in the case of future climate risks 
associated with climate change scenarios. The 
platform‟s architecture has been developed to 
be modular, extensible and open, enabling the 
possibility of harnessing various inputs and 
contributions. This tool and more information 
about it are available at www.ecapra.org.  
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5. Synthesis and conclusion 
Vulnerability assessments are an important part 
of risk governance and building risk 
management strategies. A sound vulnerability 
assessment can serve as basis for choosing a 
management strategy and allocating a budget. It 
should help take into consideration populations 
most in need and elements most at risk, with a 
final aim to reduce vulnerability and adverse 
impacts with appropriate and cost-effective, 
targeted measures. The project MOVE focuses 
on the conceptual development and practical 
application of vulnerability assessments towards 
risk management strategies, comforted by case 
studies.  
This manual aims to transfer this knowledge to 
stakeholders and to give them the key elements 
to apply the MOVE procedure and to complete 
vulnerability assessments as a preliminary and 
essential step toward efficient risk management.  
This document presents the conceptual 
framework elaborated by the MOVE project, as 
well as how to proceed to apply this framework 
when dealing with vulnerability and risk 
assessments at various scales.  
The manual aids the process of going from 
theoretical issues to practical applications. After 
a short presentation of the MOVE conceptual 
framework, a list of procedural steps is offered. 
These procedural steps should ensure that no 
crucial aspect of vulnerability and no working 
steps are overlooked or left out. Procedural 
steps refer to methods and tools described in the 
„toolbox‟. The most often used techniques are 
described, pointing out strengths, weaknesses, 
and potential problems, as well as suggesting 
additional reading material.  
Furthermore, the manual provides links to: 
 a data base of important indicators for 
practically assessing vulnerability and/or parts 
of it; 
 a handbook compiling the results of seven 
different case studies completed within the 
MOVE project (urban, rural, coastal and 
mountain environments) by applying the 
conceptual framework to make vulnerability 
assessments; 
 a glossary that explains the risk vocabulary 
conventions to be used when applying the 
MOVE guidelines.  
The choice was made in the MOVE project to 
keep the framework at a general level. It allows 
the possibility to adapt the methodology to the 
specifics of each application (regional 
characteristics, specific hazards, management 
objectives, scales…).As previously mentioned, 
this manual is intended to ease the work of 
practitioners, such as local administrations and 
land use planners, when applying this procedure 
to their region, as well as to be a step toward 
building a European interdisciplinary standard for 
vulnerability assessments.  
Further interdisciplinary research can use the 
MOVE generic framework and procedural steps, 
and improves it by developing methods to 
integrate missing topics or to develop standards 
that can be applied more generically or 
specifications for more detailed applications. 
Feedback on applications and improvements will 
help to keep the MOVE approach alive and 
relevant to risk management issues. 
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DVD content 
MOVE Glossary 
MOVE Guideline on Vulnerability assessment development of different methods (deliverable D6 for 
MOVE WP1.1, 1.2 and WP2.2, 2.4,2.5 
Illustrations of MOVE methodology application on cases studies-Posters delivered for the stakeholder 
meeting of Salzburg (06/06/2011) 
 
 
 
 
Link to the MOVE indicators database 
The web-based MOVE indicators database can be found on http://www.move-fp7.eu/ 
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